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NEPAL: OBSTACLES TO PEACE  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite King Gyanendra’s appointment of a new 
prime minister in June 2003, Nepal remains in a 
deepening political crisis. By turns conciliatory and 
confrontational, its royalist government, the Maoist 
insurgents and the recently ousted political parties 
have all proven capable of derailing the peace 
process if their concerns are not addressed. With 
political parties shut out of peace talks and the 
palace continuing efforts to keep them off balance 
and marginalised, party activists have increasingly 
taken to the streets. This has left the king in an 
awkward position: wishing to retain control of the 
government without appearing to be doing so. Such 
an approach is ultimately untenable, as the 
controversial appointment of Prime Minister Surya 
Bahadur Thapa makes clear.  
A large number of constitutional issues will have to 
be tackled if Nepal hopes to resolve either the war 
with the Maoists or its constitutional crisis. 
However, it will not be possible to forge a broad 
consensus on these issues if the king remains the 
supreme decision-maker and the peace talks remain 
solely a dialogue between palace representatives 
and the Maoists. Establishing an all-party 
government is an essential step in beginning the 
march back toward a genuine democratic process 
regardless of the Maoists’ relative sincerity about 
peace.  
It is also incumbent upon the political parties to act 
more responsibly. They should forge an agreement 
on the composition of an all-party government and 
present this to the palace before an all-party 
government is formed. Only by curtailing their 
perpetual internal feuding can they demonstrate to 
the people of Nepal that they are serious about 
governance and to be trusted with a seat at the 
negotiating table.  
With the broad range of issues that have been 
opened by the war and the constitutional crisis, a 
lasting solution demands the support and input of 
an array of social forces well beyond the king, the 
parties and the Maoists. Efforts to tackle the 
country’s deep economic and social disparities 
should be paramount in constitutional reform. 
Consensus must be developed on several broad 
issues: the need for substantial and well-structured 
decentralisation of power and budgetary authority; 
stronger civilian control over the Royal Nepalese 
Army (RNA); a more representative electoral 
system; and ensuring that no one, including the 
king, is deemed above the law. All these are areas 
where reasonable compromise can create a broad 
convergence of opinion not only between the 
Maoists, the parties and the palace, but across 
society as a whole. 
It is also crucial that the peace process itself be 
managed more professionally. The unsteady pace 
of negotiations, changes in personnel, failures of 
communication and lack of adequately trained 
negotiators and facilitators all have the potential to 
unravel an already uncertain process. Yet another 
change of both government and negotiators in the 
middle of talks has only hardened suspicions and 
further slowed matters. The government and the 
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international community should explore ways to 
provide negotiators with the tools they need to 
make talks successful. Small numbers of UN 
experts from neutral countries could be deployed to 
assist local groups observe the code of conduct 
signed by the government and the Maoists to 
go90vern their behaviour during the ceasefire, and 
trained facilitators could be brought behind the 
scenes to ensure that negotiations proceed in a 
more orderly and professional manner. Peace can 
only be made and secured by the Nepalese, but the 
international community can and should play an 
important supporting role. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To King Gyanendra, the palace and the 
royalist government:  
1.  Make clear that as part of any negotiated peace 
settlement or constitutional revision the 
monarch and the royal family will no longer 
be considered above the law, and that specific 
actions by the king can be questioned by the 
parliament or the courts. 
2.  Reconvene an all-party meeting and indicate 
that the king will accept the formation of an 
all-party government if the political parties 
represented in the last parliament reach an 
agreement on power-sharing within such a 
government. 
3.  If progress is made on forming an all-party 
government, ensure that the composition of 
the delegation negotiating with the Maoists 
includes all the major political parties. 
4.  Endorse the notion of small numbers of UN 
experts – drawn from neutral and non-
controversial nations – assisting in monitoring 
the code of conduct, working directly with the 
National Human Rights Commission and 
providing that body the technical assistance it 
needs to carry out independent, impartial and 
credible monitoring in areas controlled by both 
the Maoists and the government.  
 
To the political parties represented in the 
former parliament: 
5.  Build pressure to restore democracy by again 
forwarding a joint selection for the post of 
prime minister, and agree on a specific power-
sharing proposal for an all-party government 
including a detailed plan identifying both party 
officials and skilled technocrats who would 
serve.  
6.  Agree to assign the Home Ministry to a neutral 
technocrat.  
To the Maoists: 
7.  Take firmer steps to ensure that extortion 
efforts – even under the guise of “donations” – 
are discontinued at the village level. 
8.  Make clear efforts, including in their mass 
communications, to educate cadres about and 
otherwise demonstrate the seriousness of their 
new commitment to multi-party democracy 
and open markets.  
9.  Continue with efforts to meet senior members 
of the Western diplomatic community as part 
of a process of mutual education.  
10. Articulate clearly to the public how they 
envision a national roundtable conference and 
constituent assembly would work in practice.  
11. Prepare cadres for the inevitable compromises 
that a serious peace negotiation must entail. 
To the royal palace, the Maoists, political 
parties and Nepalese civil society: 
12. To assist the peace process and eventual 
constitutional revisions, develop a basic 
minimum consensus on a program for 
constitutional change and institutional reform 
involving: 
(a) a formula for the substantial devolution 
of power and financial authority (perhaps 
establishment of a federal system); 
(b) efforts to reduce the number of districts to 
a more manageable scale and to draw 
reconstituted districts along geographic 
and not ethnic lines; and  
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(c) steps to remove the current ambiguity 
concerning the role of the monarchy with 
regard to “emergency” powers and 
oversight of the Royal Nepalese Army. 
To the International Community: 
13. Steadily increase pressure on the king and the 
royalist govern ment to form an all-party 
government and set a clear timetable for a 
return to democracy. 
14. Make clear, quietly, but firmly, especially to 
the government, that international mediation 
or facilitation for the peace talks would be 
useful and made available, including a range 
of technical assistance such as the training of 
negotiators and help in establishing a more 
effective secretariat for talks. 
15. Regional powers India and China should lift 
opposition to international technical assistance 
for Nepalese groups designated to monitor the 
“code of conduct” – the agreement between 
the Maoists and the RNA governing their 
behaviour during the cease fire.  
16. India, the United States and United Kingdom 
should make clear that the further provision of 
military assistance to the government of Nepal 
will remain contingent upon good faith efforts 
at the negotiating table and a clear timetable 
for restoring democratic order.  
Kathmandu/Brussels, 17 June 2003 
 
  
 
 
ICG Asia Report N°57 17 June 2003 
NEPAL: OBSTACLES TO PEACE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the 5 June 2003 swearing in of Prime Minister 
Surya Bahadur Thapa, Nepal appeared to continue 
a relentless series of political reshuffles that has 
failed to provide the conditions for lasting peace or 
stability. The 75-year-old Thapa, who has served as 
prime minister four times previously,1 was hand-
picked by King Gyanendra over the strenuous 
objections of the mainstream political parties and 
amid increasing concern by the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) that the political machinations 
were designed to derail the peace process.2 In 
effect, the appointment – other than generating a 
great deal of general animosity and concern that the 
king is looking to cement his hold on power – did 
little to change the current dynamic and may only 
further encourage both the parties and the Maoists 
to take to the streets.  
Even before Thapa’s appointment, an uneasy back 
and forth between negotiators from the Nepalese 
royalist government and the Maoists over the pace, 
agenda and substance of peace talks seemed to 
suggest that any deal struck solely between them 
 
 
1 Thapa served as Prime Minister three times during the 
panchayat  era (1963-1964; 1965-1969; and 1979-1983), 
and once after democracy was instated (1997-1998).  
2 For purposes of this report, the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) is referred simply to as “the Maoists”. For 
extensive background on the genesis of the war in Nepal, 
see ICG Asia Report No. 50, Nepal Backgrounder: 
Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, 10 April 
2003.  
would not stand the test of time. By the reckoning 
of almost all involved, any peace deal will require 
some form of constitutional amendment, or even 
the preparation of a new constitution. Without the 
broad buy-in of society, constitutional revision will 
be less a social compact than another short-term 
expedient for the palace and the Maoists. Nepal’s 
experience since 1990 has already demonstrated 
that unless the broad forces in society act in the 
spirit of the constitution, its implementation will be 
uneven and problematic, making it all the more 
difficult to establish the rule of law. 
The mainstream political parties, currently 
excluded from both government and peace talks, 
have become increasingly vocal regarding what 
they call “regressive” steps by the king on 4 
October 2002 in suspending the democratic 
process. They have backed up their expressions of 
discontent with an active and escalating agenda of 
social protest. The king’s decision to appoint Thapa 
rather than a consensus candidate backed by five 
major parties only seemed to harden resolve. A 
European ambassador described the situation as, “a 
rather lethal combination of stalled negotiations, 
national strikes and paralysis in the centre, 
compounded by traditional complacency among the 
Kathmandu elite who think the Maoists have come 
out of the jungle with their hands up”.3 In short, 
even if the two-way talks between palace and 
Maoists were to resume quickly after the break 
caused by the political upheavals, such a 
negotiating structure appears poorly suited for 
 
 
3 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April  2003. 
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reaching concord on fundamental issues of 
governance and state institutions. 
All this makes clear that the issues in Nepal are 
complex and deeply interlocked, and that 
thoughtful and pragmatic leadership will be needed 
by both the Nepalese and the international 
community if the situation is to not spin out of 
control again. This report looks at the key 
substantive and procedural issues that pose a direct 
threat to a very fragile peace, and makes practical 
and specific recommendations to help all sides 
move forward.  
A. UNDEMOCRATIC PEACE? 
Before the 30 May 2003 resignation of Prime 
Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand, widespread 
student protests directly backed by the Congress 
Party and the Unified Marxist Leninists (UML) 
repeatedly brought much of the country to a 
standstill. These have largely consisted of bandhs , 
or general strikes, that businesses and the 
government observe by simply closing for the day. 
Large numbers of police and military have been 
deployed to counter any potential violence. A 
number of college campuses have seen the burning 
of government vehicles by angry students and 
altercations with security forces. A handful of 
student leaders have disappeared or been killed. 4 
While these protests were originally launched in 
response to rising fuel prices and delayed student 
elections, they were quickly used by the political 
parties to demonstrate that while they lack the 
armed force of both the government and the 
Maoists, they can still play a major spoiler role if 
their views are not taken into consideration. 
 
 
4 Student protests over price hikes in kerosene erupted with 
increasing violence after the Chairman of the Nepal 
Progressive Student’s Union, Devi Ram Poudel, was shot 
and killed by police during a demonstration on 8 April 
2003. After the protests widened and a number of student 
leaders were detained, the decapitated bodies of two such 
leaders, Prit Kumar Moktan and Bhupendra Timalsina, 
associated with the All Nepal National Independent 
Student’s Union (Revolutionary) – a Maoist aligned group 
– were found. The government has denied any links to the 
killings. 
At a mass rally in Kathmandu on 4 May 2003, the 
Congress Party and the UML (joined by several 
smaller parties) announced a series of protests 
beginning on 8 May that have included the boycott 
of government functions, torch-lit rallies, blocking 
of government vehicles and even, on 28 May, 
convening of a “shadow” session of the dissolved 
parliament.5 Portraying their actions as a second 
phase of the “people’s movement” that led to the 
acceptance of the multi-party system by King 
Birendra in April 1990, the parties have 
increasingly made the royal palace the target of 
their rhetoric. At the 8 May rally, Congress Party 
leader Girija Prasad Koirala went so far as to claim 
that the “Palace is the root cause of all the 
instability that has beset the nation in the past many 
years”.6 He added, “This movement is directly 
targeted against the king and such activities”.  
Koirala’s comments rather conveniently overlook 
the share of blame that the political parties, 
including his, deserve for the continuing crisis. 
However, they underscore the fact that it will be 
difficult to achieve a lasting peace if Nepal’s 
democratic forces feel they are completely 
marginalised by both an assertive monarch and 
Maoist forces who have always made their 
contempt for party leaders well-known.  
Reaction to the move by the parties to step up street 
demonstrations has been mixed and often highly 
critical. Former Prime Minister Lokendra Chand 
lambasted them for “fomenting trouble at a time 
when the government and the Maoists are engaged 
in the peace process”, blamed them for most of the 
country’s difficulties since 1990, and insisted that it 
was their brinkmanship that forced the king to 
restore an environment of law and order. 7  
 
 
5 At least twelve former parliamentarians were injured 
when police mounted a baton charge at protestors headed 
for the parliament. 
6 The Kathmandu Post , 5 May 2003. 
7 Prime Minister Chand’s address to the nation, 1 May 
2003. As has been noted by a number of political 
commentators, his comments gloss over the fact that he has 
long been active in party politics and served as prime 
minister in a democratically elected government during the 
1990s. 
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While it is easy to dismiss these comments as 
somewhat self-serving, many Nepalese do appear 
concerned that street protests could get out of 
control and spark entirely unpredictable violence. 
The public has widely and rightly decried property 
destruction by students, and many in Kathmandu 
and across the country are simply weary of the 
seemingly unending barrage of bandhs , with their 
associated costs and inconveniences.8 However, the 
king’s continuing resistance to an all-party 
government may well be generating increased 
backing for street protests in support of democracy.  
The party activities have also received a cool 
reception in the diplomatic community. A senior 
Western diplomat observed, “The parties are not 
playing a very helpful role. They are spoilers at this 
point. Peaceful protest is fine, but leaders should 
lead and they should come out against violence”.9 
This diplomat also suggested that the greatest 
failure of the parties was their inability to galvanise 
public and international support for elections after 
the King suspended the democratic process.  
Part of the problem with the parties remains their 
consistent inability to articulate a clear vision of 
where they want to take the country. One 
international democracy expert explained: 
The parties here still want to win over every 
voter in Nepal, and so they only express their 
views in the broadest generalities, being for 
“peace”, “development” and “equality”. They 
have no sense of targeting a specific platform 
to specific constituencies, and consequently 
there is no real debate about issues and no 
 
 
8 On 21 April 2003, students set the varsity printing press 
building at Tribhuvan University ablaze with considerable 
property damage. The image of students burning a printing 
press quickly became emblematic for those objecting to the 
protests. In addition, a survey by the Nepalese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry claims that the country loses about 
.3 per cent of gross domestic product during each bandh . 
While this figure is likely somewhat inflated, it does speak 
to the scope of the problem at a time when there were four 
bandhs in less than a ten day period in late April 2003. 
9 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2003. 
mandate for pushing forward specific 
policies. 10  
Yet, as the street protests have demonstrated, the 
parties – while often quite poor at moving a 
positive agenda – are quite good at being 
obstructionist. This also suggests that they retain a 
measure of support among the public. 
An international democracy expert was taken aback 
by the effectiveness of recent party protests at the 
local level, even in areas where mainstream 
political activists have often been intimidated by 
Maoist cadres in recent years. This expert observed:  
In all the districts I travelled through, and in 
many more, there were well-coordinated 
events with an impressive turnout of ex-local 
officials and political cadres. These activities 
included sit-in protests in each Village 
Development Committee and Municipality, 
sit-in protests in each District Development 
Committee and picketing at District 
Administrative Offices. 11  
In some locations protests have been largely 
peaceful, while in others police crackdowns only 
seemed to generate local sympathy for the 
protestors. According to this expert, participants in 
the district movements were much more 
representative than protestors in the capital and 
were putting forward a common message that “we 
are local officials elected by the people and our 
power has been usurped”.  
While creating a three-way peace deal – parties, 
palace and Maoists – may involve seemingly 
endless headaches, it is increasingly apparent that a 
deal without the parties may simply be impossible. 
One senses that part of the international reluctance to 
speak more forcefully for democracy in Nepal is 
driven by the sheer frustration of diplomats in dealing 
with party leaders. While such an hypothesis is 
obviously impossible to prove objectively, the sense 
of exasperation among diplomats who cite corruption, 
doublespeak and petty self-interest as frequent sins 
 
 
10 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 30 April 2003. 
11 ICG correspondence, 27 May 2003. 
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among party leaders is plain. Many of these embassy 
officials speak more kindly of the king, his desire for 
reform and the general effic iency exuded by the 
palace. However, it would be a shame if the 
international community gave short shrift to a young 
and fragile democracy simply because the palace 
“runs a better meeting”. 
Nepal’s political parties remain discredited in many 
eyes for their often-dysfunctional performance 
while in office, but as an influential journalist 
argued, “the long-term solution is with the political 
parties. The diplomatic community has painted 
itself into a corner by bad mouthing the parties for 
so long. The parties are not as bad as they are made 
out to be”.12 This comes at a time when two of the 
Nepalese facilitators engaged in the peace process 
have directly warned that the talks could fall apart 
in 2003 as they did in 200. "Much like the previous 
time, there are chances that the talks may founder. 
The reason is there is no role for political forces, 
civil society and human rights activists", argued 
Padma Ratna Tuladhar.13  
B. THE KING’S QUANDARY 
The king’s handling of the recent switch in prime 
ministers underscores the inherent danger in having 
all government policy flow from within the palace 
walls. When Prime Minister Lokendra Chand 
announced his “resignation” on 30 May after eight 
months in office, it was widely assumed that he had 
been pressured to step down by the king. There was 
also widespread anticipation that the monarch 
would use the resignation as an opportunity to form 
an all-party government. 
The impression that the king was eager to reach out 
to the parties was heightened when he hosted an 
all-party meeting at the palace on the evening of 30 
May during which he asked the five parliamentary 
parties to forward a common candidate for prime 
minister within 72 hours. Although the parties 
engaged in much of their usual infighting, they did 
agree on UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar 
Nepal as their choice to run the new government. It 
 
 
12 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2003. 
13 Kathmandu Post, 11 May 2003. 
is also of note that two members of the 
government’s negotiating team at that time, who 
each head other parties, threw their hats into the 
ring, calling into question their ability to focus on 
the peace talks.14  
Despite the agreement on a common candidate 
among the five parties that have been leading the 
protests against the government, the king appointed 
Thapa. The palace also announced that it would 
restore full executive powers to the prime minister, 
in what appeared to be a half-hearted step to 
encourage the parties to join the government.  
Thapa’s appointment brought intense speculation 
within Nepal that foreign forces – particularly the 
United States and India – had directly intervened to 
block the parties’ choice because they were 
uncomfortable with a government headed by a 
Marxist-Leninist party leader, despite the fact that 
the UML is far more centrist than its name would 
imply. Some also hypothesised that the king 
dangled the prospect of an all-party government in 
front of the parties as part of a failed effort to 
encourage greater divisions between the Congress 
and UML, or simply as part of a larger strategy to 
take a “go-slow” approach both to negotiations and 
the restoration of democracy.  
Thapa is the former head of the Rastriya Prajantra 
Party (RPP), the same party as his predecessor. He 
had made a six-day visit to India immediately after 
an audience with King Gyanendra in late April, 
fuelling speculation that he was angling for the 
prime ministerial post at that time. Despite his 
efforts to pull members of the UML and Congress 
into his cabinet, the mainstream parties have made 
clear that they still view the government as an 
unconstitutional puppet of the palace and that they 
will continue street protests.  
Shortly after Thapa’s appointment, the Prime 
Minister announced the formation of a new 
negotiating team on 12 June 2003. This 
reconstituted team includes Finance Minister Dr. 
Prakash Chandra Lohani and Minister of 
Communications Kamal Thapa. It is anticipated 
 
 
14 Minister for Physical Planning Pun and Deputy Prime 
Minsiter Badri Prasad Mandal 
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that this team will be expanded in the coming 
weeks. Maoist officials indicated a willingness to 
continue talks with this new team, but the overhaul 
of the government negotiating team will surely 
delay what already appears to be a protracted peace 
process. 
In private conversations, both party officials and 
diplomats suggest that before Chand’s resignation 
the king had repeatedly made overtures to bring the 
leaders of the Congress and UML parties into 
government – even offering the post of prime 
minister job as an incentive.15 However, party 
leaders were and are reluctant, fearing that it would 
give the royalist government a broad stamp of 
legitimacy without securing genuine executive 
authority for democratic leadership. One Western 
ambassador suggested that while the king had been 
“toying with” the notion of an all-party 
government, “demonstrations have convinced him 
that he needs more breathing room”.16 The 
accelerated investigations into the parties by the 
Commission for the Investigation for the Abuse of 
Authority (CIAA) may also be a sign that the 
palace is eager to keep the parties off balance for 
some time.17  
King Gyanendra’s quandary appears to be that he 
wishes to remain in control but not look like it. This 
has led to a series of changes within the cabinet at 
his behest that ultimately culminated with Chand 
being out a job. On 11 April 2003, three ministers 
were dismissed: Home Minister Dharma Bahadur 
Thapa; Education Minister Devi Prasad Ojha; and 
Minister for Indus try, Commerce and Supplies 
Mahesh Lal Pradhan. This was announced in a 
press release issued by the palace, implying that 
King Gyanendra had acted in keeping with his 
emergency powers under the constitution. It was 
widely suggested that the home minister was 
dismissed for opposition to the peace talks, while 
the other two were dismissed for poor handling of 
the student protests and the kerosene price hikes 
 
 
15 ICG interviews, April-May 2003. 
16 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April 2003. 
17 The CIAA was established in the constitution to conduct 
inquiries and investigations into improper conduct or 
corruption by any person holding public office. 
that helped give momentum to the initial 
demonstrations.  
But changing prime ministers without bringing in 
either the UML or Congress has done little to belie 
the notion that the king maintains absolute 
authority within the government. As one journalist 
said, “It is baffling that the king maintains the 
façade that he is not in control”.18 This fiction is 
quite useful in keeping international support for the 
struggle against the Maoists. However, the longer 
the king retains control over the political system, 
and the longer the period without elections, the 
more difficult it will be for major international 
actors to continue largely unconditional military 
and development assistance.  
While those currently in government often say the 
correct thing about the need for a restoration of 
democracy and the importance of including the 
parties in the peace process, their true feelings 
sometimes emerge from behind closed doors. A 
former member of the government negotiating team 
maintained, “His Majesty has made it very clear 
that he supports democracy and constitutional 
monarchy”, but added, “If the parties are only 
concerned about the legitimacy of the government, 
and not the peace process, and they weaken 
themselves, they will only hurt the country”. And 
more bluntly: “Nobody really cares about multi-
party democracy; they want peace”.19 The re-
emergence of several hardline advisors from the 
panchayat era in the king’s inner circle – “very 
nasty characters” as one veteran Nepal expert 
commented – has also raised concerns about the 
king’s attitude toward multi-party government.20  
Although the king controls the military and the 
commanding heights of the government, his hold 
on power is in many ways precarious. Observing 
that he has no real organisational support in the 
way that the parties do, a journalist said, “the king’s 
power is brittle, and despite their weakness the 
 
 
18 ICG interview, Patan, 4 May. 
19 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April 2003. 
20 ICG interview, 13 June 2003. 
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parties are not as brittle as the palace and the 
Maoists”.  21  
Ironically, by seizing control of the state through 
what has been widely and rightly seen as a series of 
extra-constitutional measures and twice appointing 
a hand-picked prime minister, King Gyanendra has 
made his own constitutional rights and 
responsibilities central to the demands of both the 
Maoists and the political parties.22 The king’s role 
as Commander in Chief of the Royal Nepalese 
Army (RNA), the legal and financial privileges 
enjoyed by the royal family, the nation’s status as a 
Hindu kingdom and even its existence as a 
constitutional monarchy are all now central to the 
debate about war, peace and potential institutional 
restructuring in a negotiated settlement.  
This is striking given that the Maoists began their 
insurgency in 1996 against a democratically-elected 
government, and that most of the issues they 
initially highlighted – corruption, political 
disenfranchisement, ethnic and caste 
discrimination, foreign influences and economic 
exclus ion – were of concern when that government 
was in place. For example, although the Maoists 
have long supported making Nepal a republic (a 
demand they have muted considerably in 
 
 
21 ICG interview, Patan, 29 April 2003. 
22 While the Supreme Court has defended the king’s action 
in seizing control of the government under the provisions 
of Article 127, the independence of the court is deeply in 
question. On 1 May 2003 the court denied a writ seeking to 
have elections called, insisting that the king’s open ended-
order to the Chand government to hold elections – without 
actually setting any timetable – was sufficient. No public 
instructions were given by the king to Prime Minister 
Thapa to schedule elections. It is difficult to read the 
Nepalese constitution as allowing an indefinite suspension 
of the democratic process while virtually all functions of 
the government flow directly from the king under Article 
127. Such sweeping royal powers seem directly contrary to 
the spirit of the constitution and its preamble, the first 
words of which note, “We are convinced that the source of 
sovereign authority of the independent and sovereign Nepal 
is inherent in the people, and, therefore, we have, from time 
to time, made known our desire to conduct the government 
of the country in consonance with the popular will”. 
Numerous lawyers and international officials interviewed 
by ICG have generally concurred that the king is operating 
beyond the bounds of the constitution.  
negotiations), the issue of resolving the 
constitutionally ambiguous influence of the king 
over the armed forces was brought to the fore 
relatively recently by the political parties and is 
now championed by the Maoists as well. 
Clearly, the power and prerogatives of the crown 
are crucial considerations for the palace, the 
Maoists and the parties. Yet, it would seem 
important to underscore that addressing these 
issues, in and of themselves, will be insufficient to 
alter the broad political, social and economic 
inequities that have fuelled conflict. It is striking 
that sentiment among Nepal’s civil society, media 
and intelligensia seems increasingly to favour 
constitutional reform far more sweeping than that 
envisaged by the king. 23 
C. THE STATE OF PEACE TALKS  
The peace process continues to move in fits and 
starts. The drama surrounding the selection of a 
new prime minister has slowed what little 
momentum had been achieved at the table, as has 
the formation of a new government team. The 
situation was initially dominated by the dramatic – 
and very public – appearance of a senior level 
Maoist negotiating team in Kathmandu at the end 
of March 2003. For most members it was the first 
time they had moved “above ground” since the 
conflict began in 1996. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the 
lead ideologue and number two in the chain of 
command, leads this team. Ram Bahadur Thapa, 
the group’s military commander and Dev Gurung 
among others, have joined him. At a rowdy press 
conference in Kathmandu on 29 March, Bhattarai 
insisted that the Maoists were sincere about peace 
talks but also made clear that they would resume 
violence if the King refused to play a constructive 
role. 
Since that initial press conference, the Maoist 
leadership has been on a whirlwind public relations 
tour, attending a large number of public events and 
holding mass rallies in Kathmandu and Nepalganj. 
By most estimates, more than 20,000 people turned 
 
 
23 ICG interviews, April-May 2003. 
Nepal: Obstacles to Peace  
ICG Asia Report N°57, 17 June 2003 Page 7 
 
 
 
out for the rally in the capital – although it remains 
open to debate how many were supporters and how 
many were simply drawn out of curiosity. Maoist 
cadres have also been quite active organising 
political roundtables and discussions at the district 
and village level in areas under their control. In 
some respects, the fact that the Maoists have come 
above ground can be viewed positively. A direct 
return to military action is unlikely while these 
individuals are still visible in Kathmandu. The 
process of holding rallies and explaining their 
platform can be seen as a logical precursor for 
entering a more mainstream role in political life. It 
is also useful for the leaders to hear a broader 
spectrum of views than they likely did while 
underground.  
There are also some clear risks to the high-profile 
strategy of the Maoists. Unfortunately, the frequent 
public appearances and intense local media 
coverage has at times degenerated into name 
calling and finger pointing between the royalist 
government, the political parties and the Maoists. 
All have frequently used contradictory and 
personalised rhetoric. Interestingly, the king has 
also held several public rallies around the country, 
acting more like a politic ian than many in the 
mainstream parties. That the parties, the palace and 
the Maoists all feel compelled to take their case 
frequently to the court of public opinion has made 
it more difficult to engage in serious discussion, but 
does demonstrate the importance of public opinion 
in shaping the political landscape.  
The Maoists also risk encouraging unrealistic 
expectations among their cadres. By insisting that 
talks are ongoing between the “old regime” and the 
“new state” they claim to embody, the Maoists may 
be creating pressure among their cadres at the 
village level not to accept any compromise of their 
maximum demands. While the Maoists have been 
very well organised, the talks are clearly producing 
strains. There have been repeated suggestions that 
the Maoists would be wiling to compromise on a 
number of core demands, but nothing suggests that 
they have begun to prepare their rank and file. They 
need to think seriously not only about the deal they 
are willing to accept, but also about how they can 
make th is palatable to their own people. 
Unfortunately, the political turmoil in the capital 
may well encourage them to a wait and see 
approach 
Some progress appeared to be made on 16 April 
when the government finally announced its 
negotiating team, a six-member group led by 
Deputy Prime Minister Badri Prasad Mandal, and 
including Lt. Col. (Retd.) Pun, who had served as 
government coordinator for the talks that produced 
the ceasefire. Four other government ministers 
joined the team: Ramesh Nath Pandey, Dr. Upendra 
Devkota, Kamal Chaulagain and Anuradha Koirala 
(the only woman on either delegation). It reflects 
poorly on the government’s seriousness about 
peace talks that it took close to three months to 
establish a full negotiating team when the Maoists 
had quite quickly assembled a senior group that 
included the heads of their political and military 
wings.  
Plans for “official” negotiations that were to be 
launched on 21 April 2003 quickly stalled as the 
Maoists complained that government negotiators 
were poorly prepared, and discussions should take 
place directly with the king. At a public rally in 
Dhangadhi, Baburam Bhattarai complained, “The 
old establishment should stop playing tricks from 
behind the curtain to make the talks a success. The 
King should attend the talks”.24 This led a former 
government negotiator to say, “Everybody is trying 
to drag the king into this, and it shouldn’t be 
done”.25 While it is understandable why the palace 
– for both protocol and appearance – does not wish 
to see the king directly involved, there will be 
continued pressure from a number of quarters to 
bring him to the table as long as he remains the 
ultimate decision maker on the government side.  
Indeed, it remains unclear how empowered 
government negotiators are to make binding 
decisions. The fear in many quarters is that even 
though the team has been overhauled, the palace 
will still have final say on all major substantive 
issues, making normal give and take at the 
negotiating table more difficult. A Scandinavian 
diplomat noted of the earlier government team, 
 
 
24 The Himalayan Times, 23 April 2003. 
25 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April 2003. 
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“They don’t have any decision making ability”.26 
Again, this underscores the inherent difficulties of 
the king wishing to retain a close hold on the 
current political process while attempting to create 
a contrary public image.  
The hiccup of delayed talks was resolved fairly 
quickly, and on 27 April, the first “official” round 
took place at the Shanker Hotel in Kathmandu. 
During over four hours, the Maoists provided a 
revised set of demands. In presenting their written 
demands to the government, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai 
argued, as he has repeatedly since coming above 
ground, that the 1990 constitution was effectively 
defunct and that a new constitution would have to 
be drafted by a constituent assembly. A member of 
the government negotiating team, while insisting 
before the meeting that “everything is negotiable”, 
countered that, “if everyone accepts the 
[constitutional] amendments, there is no need to 
move toward a constituent assembly”.27  
The central Maoist demands included: 
q return of the RNA to its barracks; 
q information on detained and missing Maoist 
cadres;28 
q a roundtable conference with representatives 
from the Maoists, the political parties and 
other democratic forces to establish an 
interim, all-party legislature under Maoist 
leadership; 
q formation within six months by this 
government of a constituent assembly to 
produce a new constitution; 
q integration of Maoist fighters into an RNA 
under civilian control; 
q declaration of Nepal as a secular state; 
q a high- level committee to investigate human 
rights abuses between 1996 and 2002; 
 
 
26 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 2 May 2003. 
27 ICG interview, Kathmandu 24 April 2003. 
28 A recent Amnesty International report claimed that more 
than 1,000 Maoists activists remain in prison. See 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA310152003 
q the right of self-determination and ethnic 
and regional autonomy for disadvantaged 
caste, ethnic and other minorities; 
q abrogation of the 1950 Peace and Friendship 
Treaty with India and implementation of a 
non-aligned foreign policy; and,  
q regulation of the border with India.29 
Notably, the issue of a republic and abolishment the 
monarchy was considerably muted in this 
presentation. The Maoists suggested that the issue 
of the monarchy be “put to the people” with 
whatever decision was made (presumably either in 
a constituent assembly or some form of 
referendum) to be binding. This is not surprising 
since the Maoists signalled flexibility toward the 
monarchy during the 2001 talks, and they are 
negotiating with a royalist government team. When 
this “concession” received a great deal of press in 
Nepal, the Maoists felt compelled to declare that 
they were not giving away any ground, insisting 
simply, in the words of their spokesperson, Krishna 
Bahadur Mahara, “We have kept the question of the 
monarchy open”.30  
The tone of the demands also seems to reflect less 
of traditional Maoist communist orthodoxy. This is 
also not surprising since as two Nepalese officials 
noted, efforts to “impose a system that has failed all 
over the world” would simply not be realistic. 31 
The negotiators agreed on a number of procedural 
steps. Four facilitators were announced for the 
talks: Padma Ratna Tuladhar; Daman Nath 
Dhungana; Shailendra Kumar Upadhyay and 
Karnadwoj Adhikari. 32 Both delegations also 
agreed to establish a joint “homework” team to 
 
 
29 The Nepal-India border is an open border. 
30 Kathmandu Post, 29 April 2003. 
31 ICG interviews, 24 April 2003, 20 May 2003. 
32 Padma Ratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana both 
served as facilitators during the abortive 2001 peace talks. 
They are former members of parliament and were 
nominated by the Maoist side. Kumar Upadhyay is a 
former government minister, and Karnadwoj Adhikari 
served as chief secretary. They were nominated by the 
royalist government. 
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discuss key issues33 and suggest means to 
implement and oversee the code of conduct signed 
by the government and Maoists to govern their 
behaviour during the ceasefire.34 
A second round of talks was conducted on 9 May, 
again at the Shanker Hotel and again largely on 
procedural issues. Afterwards, government 
negotiators appeared to agree to restrict RNA 
forces within five kilometres of their bases. This 
would have been an important tactical victory for 
the Maoists, given their long insistence that the 
RNA be returned to barracks, and would have 
provided them a potential military advantages since 
there would not have been a parallel restriction on 
their own cadres.  
However, five days later, an RNA spokesperson  
indicated that the military would not restrict its 
movements until the Maoists returned weapons 
looted from it during the war.35 This set off 
confusing and continuing exchanges regarding 
whether the notion of restricting RNA movements 
was merely a proposal or had actually been 
accepted. There has even been suggestion that the 
king sacked former Prime Minister Chand as a face 
saving gesture after the RNA directly objected to 
the king’s willingness to restrict its movements.36  
A thirteen-member team was also established to 
monitor the code of conduct, drawn largely from 
Nepalese civil society groups. Major political 
issues were not discussed, although all parties insist 
they will be on the agenda for future sessions. A 
third round was tentatively scheduled for late May 
2003, in Rolpa or Rukum, but was delayed by the 
political intrigues around the appointment of Prime 
Minister Thapa that appeared to sour the 
environment. The government’s decision to replace 
 
 
33 The homework team has two representatives from each 
delegation: Deputy Prime Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey 
and Minister Narayan Singh Pun on the government side; 
Krishna Bahadur Mahara and Ram Bahadur Thapa from 
the Maoist side. 
34 For a fuller explanation of the code and a copy of its text 
see ICG Asia Report, Nepal Backgrounde, op. cit., p. 7. 
35 See Kantipur, The Himalayan Times and The Kathmandu 
Post, 15 May 2003. 
36 Chitra Tiwari, “Nepal turmoil unabated”, Washington 
Times, 7 June 2003. 
its entire negotiating team further added to the 
general atmosphere of confusion and mistrust.37 
The Maoists expressed direct concern that those 
manoeuvres were designed to undercut the talks, 
and their tone toward the palace became decidedly 
sharper. Dr. Bhattarai said of Thapa, “There is no 
elemental difference between his predecessor and 
him. He [the king] would do better to continue the 
four-month-old peace process”.38 In a separate 
interview (appearing in The Times of India), 
Bhattari claimed, “Americans have total control 
over the army and palace in Nepal”, but had 
promoted Thapa because his pro-Indian sentiments 
would appease New Delhi. 39 The Maoists indicated 
that they would be willing to continue talks with 
the new government team, but suggested that they 
would expect the government to fulfil all 
agreements made by the previous team. Both the 
Maoists and the parties argue that the latest moves 
by the palace are indications that the king remains 
intent on securing and expanding his powers.  
The Maoists also indicated in early June that they 
would launch a national “people’s movement” and 
pursue dialogue with the parties about initiating a 
joint movement built around street protests. If this 
came to pass, it would mark a major escalation: 
with the government arrayed against both the 
parties and the Maoists in the streets, the potential 
for violence would be significant.  
As the mounting pressure for street protests 
demonstrates, progress at the peace talks has been 
limited, and the parties and the Maoists have 
increasing reasons to find common ground against 
the palace. While it is encouraging that the 
ceasefire has lasted since January 2003, the Maoists 
have made clear that they will not entertain an 
indefinite process. They appear eager to consolidate 
any possible gains at the peace table quickly, since 
their field organisation will be difficult to hold 
together, and the palace may be less willing to 
compromise as the memory of fighting becomes 
 
 
37 It has been indicated that the four facilitators will 
maintain their role in the talks despite the overhaul of the 
government team.  
38 Kathmandu Post, 5 June 2003. 
39 The Times of India, 10 June 2003. 
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more distant. The Maoists have repeatedly 
expressed concern that the government is simply 
stalling. While it appears unlikely they have any 
immediate plans to cut off talks unless a specific 
issue such as returning the RNA to barracks spirals 
out of control, the king’s willingness to ignore the 
political parties may embolden them to strike 
against a government that is increasingly seen as 
illegitimate.  
In many ways, the Maoists appeared somewhat torn 
by the street protests of the political parties before 
Chand’s dismissal. At one level, they clearly 
welcomed the mounting pressure on the palace, and 
a continuing atmosphere of crisis could be to their 
benefit whether or not they want peace. The forces 
that evolved into the current Maoist organisation 
were active in the 1990 street protests that led to 
democracy being established. One journalist 
observed that with “street fearlessness and 
organisational skills [the Maoists] tipped the 
balance last time, so much depends on if they want 
to participate”.40  
Yet, one also senses wariness toward the increasing 
activity of the parties. At a fundamental level, the 
Maoists may be calculating that if negotiations 
broaden into a three-way dialogue, their own piece 
of the pie will be that much smaller. Further, if the 
Maoists are serious about entering mainstream 
political life, it would be dangerous for them to be 
seen as collaborating with the palace while the 
major political parties were assailing the monarchy 
for “regression” and no timetable for elections had 
been set. It is also somewhat ironic that the Maoists 
have occasionally appeared perturbed that the 
parties are serving as a disruptive social force – as 
if that were a function they wish to reserve for 
themselves. The Maoists may also fear that the 
parties are poised to regain a hold in some of the 
districts where they have been less active during 
the war.  
Many remain deeply sceptical about the democratic 
credentials of the Maoists. As the same journalist 
suggested, “The Maoists are the only dynamic 
force left, everyone is making it up as they go 
 
 
40 ICG interview, Patan, 3 May 2003. 
along. They are the only ones who know where 
they are going, and it is not bourgeois 
democracy”.41 This was echoed by a senior 
Western diplomat: “The Maoists haven’t given up 
on their long term goal, and their long term goal is 
a one-party republic”. 42 To help allay these 
concerns, the Maoists should take further steps to 
demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions. 
They should take firmer steps to ensure that 
extortion efforts – even under the guise of 
“donations” – are discontinued at the village level. 
If the group is indeed serious about accepting 
multi-party democracy and open markets as it has 
indicated, there should be clear efforts to educate 
the cadres as to this seemingly new reality, and 
Maoist mass communications should reflect this 
fact.  
One senior UML leader described the current 
situation: 
We are at a stage where we are facing great 
challenges. It is the king versus the parties 
and the Maoists versus the present state. All 
are very good players, all want to use each 
other and all fear each other.43 
The Maoists also continue to remain quite wary of 
the palace and the influence of the U.S. on its 
decision-making, and are deeply concerned by U.S. 
efforts to assist the RNA. Two incidents highlight 
how the American role can often have a 
disproportionate impact, even in matters that seem 
routine to Washington’s diplomats. For example, 
the U.S. and Nepal signed a fairly standard anti-
terrorism pact in late April 2003, the 127th 
Washington has done. The Memorandum of Intent 
did not single out the Maoists for specific attention, 
or even mention them by name. However, Baburam 
Bhattarai quickly protested: “On the one hand, the 
government is pretending to be serious for talks, 
while on the other it is conniving with the United 
States to crush the people’s war waged by the 
Maoists”.44  
 
 
41 ICG interview, Patan, 3 May 2003. 
42 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2003. 
43 ICG interview, Patan 30 April 2003. 
44 The Himalayan Times, 27 April 2003. 
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Similarly, the decision by the State Department to 
place the Maoists in the second-tier of terrorists 
groups in its annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” 
report released that same month also sparked an 
angry reaction and accusations that Washington 
was trying to scuttle the peace talks.45 A Nepalese 
government official suggested that the strong 
reaction may have come in part because, “The 
Maoists want to give the impression that they are 
negotiating from a position of strength, and not 
create an impression that they were pressurised to 
come to the table”.46 While the Maoists have often 
over-reacted to U.S. steps, the Americans have not 
been particularly sensitive to the timing of their 
actions or how they would play out in the context 
of a very uncertain peace process. The international 
community should continue efforts to meet with 
Maoist representatives as part of a process of 
mutual education. 
 
 
45 See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/ for a copy 
of the report. 
46 ICG interview, 20 May 2003. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
After thirteen years of uncertain democracy, 
constitutional considerations are again front and 
centre. The Maoists, political parties, the monarchy 
and broad swathes of the public all seem to agree 
that some alterations in the basic guiding principles 
of the state are necessary to achieve peace and 
greater equity and political participation across the 
nation. Yet, there are many signs that the potential 
process of revising the constitution has not been 
fully thought out. As a Nepalese constitutional 
lawyer suggested, “w hen the Maoists say it is a 
dead constitution, and there is no alternative but to 
write a new one, they have not been clear what the 
real alternatives are”.47 This same lawyer noted, 
“Nepal is a very complicated country from a 
constitutional perspective, and the constitution 
needs to reflect the social reality”. 
Drafting a sound constitution would need to be a 
political and cultural process as much as a legal 
one. This section explores some of the most 
important considerations, while recognising that 
each item will demand fuller analysis by all 
Nepalese interests. Clearly, any revision should be 
guided by an understanding of why the existing 
constitution has never fulfilled its promise. There 
appears to be wide agreement that the flaws of the 
1990 document are more in its implementation than 
its particulars, although there are some strongly 
dissenting views.48 One scholar observed: “The  
main problem isn’t the constitution, it is people not 
following the rules that exist”.49  
This broad failure to embrace the spirit of the 
constitution can be traced directly back to 1990. 
Forged after intense confrontation and street 
protests by the political parties against the palace, 
much of the actual drafting was conducted as a 
“gentlemen’s agreement” between King Birendra, 
the Congress Party and a coalition of communist 
parties. The process was largely restricted to a 
 
 
47 ICG interview, Patan, 11 March 2003. 
48 ICG interviews, March-May 2003. 
49 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April 2003. 
Nepal: Obstacles to Peace  
ICG Asia Report N°57, 17 June 2003 Page 12 
 
 
 
close-knit group, and the palace managed to push 
through a number of major revisions from the 
original draft.50 The parties and the palace 
maintained deep mutual suspicion during this 
period, and there was little effort to broaden this 
process into a more meaningful discussion across 
socie ty or to create a general consensus on the 
institutions of state beyond the importance of multi-
party democracy. Although establishing democracy 
and the rule of law are obviously dependent on 
complex factors, the drafting process did not help 
set the tone.  
In part because the constitution did not serve as a 
genuine social compact, all sides appeared to be 
willing to play fast and loose with the rules of the 
game once democracy was established. Political 
parties became increasingly corrupt and saw fit to 
bend the constitution to their parliamentary 
advantage; Maoists, frustrated by lack of electoral 
success, turned to violence; the palace manipulated 
politicians throughout the 1990s before assuming 
power in what amounted to a bloodless coup in 2002; 
and the Supreme Court kept its finger to the political 
wind, remaining reluctant to challenge the power 
structure by showing genuine independence.51  
There appears to be broad agreement among experts 
that constitutions need the general buy-in of large 
segments of society if they are to be effectively 
implemented and observed, particularly in a culture as 
richly layered as Nepal’s. As the Swiss constitutional 
lawyer Walter Kalin suggests, “The question of 
inclusion is especially relevant in countries with a 
high degree of cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, 
i.e. with fragmented societies. Their biggest challenge 
is to create unity without denying that diversity”.52 
Sadly, this sense of common vision never occurred in 
Nepal. The country is now at the threshold it should 
 
 
50 For an interesting, but decidedly pro-royalist, perspective 
on these events see Jan Sharma Democracy Without Roots 
(Book Faith India), Delhi 1998.  
51 In defence of the Supreme Court, one lawyer noted, “The 
Supreme Court cannot provide a political solution to Nepal’s 
problems”. ICG interview, Nepalganj, 6 March 2003. 
52 Walter Kalin, “Inclusive Constitutional Law”, paper 
presented 24 April 2003 at The Agenda of Transformation. 
Inclusion in Nepalese Democracy organised by the Social 
Sciences Baha, Kathmandu.  
have crossed in 1990: having a fundamental 
discussion among broad segments of society about 
the rules that should govern the political and legal 
process. In looking at the range of extraordinarily 
complex major issues now on the table – religion, 
language, representation, decentralising political and 
economic power, control of the security services, 
royal privilege and minority rights – one can almost 
understand why the framers of the 1990 constitution 
were eager to keep close control over the process. But 
1990 should also stand as a clear warning that a 
backroom deal arranged solely between Maoist and 
palace negotiators will not achieve the social 
consensus needed to make a new or revised 
constitution a living document. 
This suggests that how Nepal tackles its full plate 
of constitutional issues will be vital. Striking a 
balance between inclusiveness and basic efficiency 
will be crucial. Just as an overly insular process 
was highly problematic in 1990, an entirely wide -
open process could be equally flawed. This helps 
explain why the fuzzy constituent assembly 
concept articulated by the Maoists would be a very 
difficult vehicle for forging a sound constitution. 
Gathering hundreds of representatives with literally 
a blank sheet of paper before them and no basic 
understanding between them on the broad contours 
of an institutional structure would seem to be a 
recipe for deeply divisive and almost endless 
wrangling. That said, constituent assemblies have 
helped craft constitutions in a number of countries 
around the globe. 
Preferably, and as discussed in greater detail below, 
a broadly representative group would mutually 
consult on potential constitutional changes, but the 
individuals would be guided by a broad agreement 
on certain fundamentals that would help shape the 
superstructure of the constitution and the goals of 
any potential revisions. Such consensus would need 
to be forged by the political parties, broad segments 
of civil society, the palace and the Maoists for the 
sake of the national interest. While not easy to 
achieve, this would likely provide the most viable 
means for moving beyond Nepal’s continuing cycle 
of crises. A number of scholars have drawn lessons 
from the post-apartheid experience in South Africa, 
where the goal of the de Klerk government, the 
Africa National Congress (ANC) and all other 
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political parties was to reach “sufficient consensus” 
on the broad strokes of a constitution.53 “Sufficient 
consensus” was used to allow input from all parties 
without giving any single group the power to derail 
the process. 
A. SHOULD THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION BE 
SAVED?  
The Maoists have declared the current constitution 
a dead letter but this may well be posturing. There 
have been repeated suggestions that the Maoists 
would be willing to accept a substantia l package of 
constitutional revisions. 54 Yet, the constitution 
itself may pose some problems in this regard, in 
that the preamble – which establishes some of the 
most important fundamentals – is not subject to 
amendment.55 Thus, it follows that if drafters wish 
to change any of them, it will require establishing 
an entirely new constitution.  
Some of the most contested measures are within that 
short preamble. While adult franchise, multiparty 
democracy and the vesting of sovereignty in the 
people are largely non-controversial, several other 
aspects are not, particularly the clear statement that 
Nepal exists as a constitutional monarchy and that the 
authority of the constitution is promulgated and 
enforced by the king. Following this logic, it would 
appear to be impossible to establish a republic by 
merely amending the constitution.  
 
 
53 See Nicholas Haysom, “Negotiating the political 
Settlement in South Africa – Are there lessons for other 
Countries”, Track Two , Vol. 11, No. 3, May 2002. 
54 As a source close to the Maoist leadership explained, 
“The Maoists have maximum flexibility and a package of 
amendments is possible, but they are not going to put all 
their cards on the table without some movement from the 
government”. ICG interview, 10 April 2003. 
55 Part 19, Article 116 of the constitution states, “A bill to 
amend or appeal any part of this constitution without 
prejudicing the spirit of this constitution, may be 
introduced in either house of parliament”. However, given 
the elasticity with which the current constitution has been 
treated, it is perhaps better to “never say never” as to the 
legality of amending the preamble – despite the fact that it 
is expressly forbidden within the constitution. 
There are divergent views as to whether the palace 
would prefer a set of amendments or a new 
constitution, and much of this speculation cuts 
directly to the role in public life envisioned by the 
king. Some argue that he would rather shape an 
amendment process because fewer issues would be 
placed on the table and there would be less chance 
that the drafting process would go beyond his direct 
influence. A republic would not be in the cards, and 
drafting would likely tinker around the edges rather 
than address fundamental changes. This relatively 
closed drafting process would allow the king to 
push revisions until late in the game, just as the late 
King Birendra did in 1990. 
In contrast, one lawyer argued that if the existing 
constitution were to be taken seriously, it would 
serve as a considerable brake on the monarch’s 
power: “The king has an interest in scrapping this 
constitution. If he wants to redefine his role, a new 
constitution is in his interest. If you take the basic 
structure of the current constitution seriously, the 
king can only have less power, not more”.56 This 
reflects thought within many quarters in Nepal that 
the parties are partially to blame for an increasingly 
assertive monarch. A prominent member of the 
Nepalese National Bar Association claimed, “The 
parties were unwilling to exercise the power they 
have” within the existing constitution, and 
consequently the palace felt more and more 
emboldened to become interventionist as the 
country’s difficulties deepened.57 The bottom line 
seems to be this: if there is broad agreement 
between the king, the Maoists and the parties to 
push through a set of amendments – even ones that 
run counter to the spirit of the preamble – 
constitutional niceties will likely be set aside. 
B. CONTROL OF THE ROYAL NEPALESE ARMY 
Strengthened civilian control of the military has 
emerged as an increasingly central demand for the 
Maoists and the political parties. Both now want, as 
one commentator observed, to “take the ‘Royal’ out 
of ‘Royal Nepalese Army’”.58 The parties and the 
 
 
56 ICG interview, Patan, 10 April 2003. 
57 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 19 March 2003. 
58 ICG interview, Nepalganj, 6 March 2003. 
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Maoists have painted a picture of the RNA serving 
only the king and being unwilling to take direction 
from elected leaders. Control of the RNA is of 
growing importance to the Maoists given that they 
want to merge their own forces into a national army 
as part of a peace deal, and placing their cadres 
under the king could simply be too much to 
swallow. It is also noted that former Prime Minister 
Koirala was so frustrated by what he considered 
RNA obstructionism that he resigned in protest in 
July 2001 (although intra-party squabbles also 
heavily influenced his decision). 
The constitutional status of the RNA is ambiguous. 
Technically, it comes under the control of a 
National Defence Council consisting of the prime 
minister (as chairman), the defence minister and the 
commander in chief of the army. 59 The constitution 
states, “His majesty shall operate and use the Royal 
Nepalese Army on the recommendation of the 
National Defence Council”, and it makes the king 
the “Supreme Commander” of the RNA with the 
power to appoint the commander in chief of the 
RNA “upon the recommendation of the prime 
minister”. 60  
This organisational scheme has often been 
problematic in practice. Most frequently the post of 
defence minister has been kept by the prime 
minister, and as a Western diplomat commented, 
“The defence ministry doesn’t play much of a role 
over the RNA; it serves as more of a procurement 
agency”.61 This has left the Defence Council to 
consist solely of the prime minister and a 
commander in chief of the army whose loyalty is 
often tied strongly to the palace. Clashes of 
institutions and personalities within such a structure 
are not surprising. Royalist government officials 
continue to insist that the current system functions 
well. A member of the government negotiating 
team claimed that the issue of the RNA is 
“misunderstood by many” and that the army can 
only be deployed under civilian command. 62 The 
vehement insistence by government officials that 
 
 
59 Part 20, Article 118, subsection 1. 
60 Part 20, Article 118, subsection 2; Part 20, Article 119, 
subsections 1 and 2. 
61 ICG interview, Kath mandu, 29 April 2003 
62 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April 2003. 
civilian control of the RNA is already a reality push 
one to conclude just the opposite; if civilian control 
already existed, the palace would have no reason to 
oppose measures to strengthen it. Certainly, the 
RNA’s recent practice of offering running 
commentary on the peace talks via press 
conferences has been less than helpful. It adds 
weight to the perception that it is playing its own 
game, as does the continuing dispute over returning 
the RNA to barracks. 
A constitutional lawyer makes a good case that the  
difficulties between the elected governments and 
the RNA ran deeper than just constitutional 
arrangements. “The civilian government has not 
been able to gain the confidence of the army”, he 
argues, and “government should have been honest, 
careful and transparent, they should not have given 
the army reason to doubt their intentions, but they 
haven’t been able to do that”.63 He maintains that 
the practice of having the king determine the 
commissioning of officers early in their careers is 
an important link in building a bond of loyalty 
between the officer corps and the palace, and that 
some younger officers have begun to question its 
appropriateness in what is supposed to be a 
constitutional monarchy. The senior ranks of the 
army continue to be filled with loyal Rana families, 
in a long tradition, and those ties to the palace 
remain largely solid.64 
A system that places the RNA more directly under 
the parliament would seem to make sense, and 
Nepal will likely need to gravitate to a model where 
the influence of the king over the military is largely 
ceremonial. If the military is to grow comfortable 
with civilian leadership, there will also need to be 
direct steps to limit the ability of elected leaders to 
use the police or armed forces for partisan 
activities. All this is to suggest that none of those 
involved in the current situation have begun to look 
seriously at the need for broad reform across the 
security sector. Nepal will likely require a smaller 
 
 
63 ICG interview, Patan, 10 April 2003. 
64 From 1846 to 1950, members of the Rana family 
dominated Nepalese politics through a hereditary line of 
prime ministers. While the kings of the Shah dynasty 
remained on the throne during this period, they were 
largely reduced to figureheads. 
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and more professional military over time and a 
police force that is better able to maintain internal 
order without engaging in widespread abuses. 
Discussions about constitutional reform and 
potentially demobilising large numbers of former 
Maoist cadres would present an ideal time to 
address these issues systematically. More research 
and analysis is badly needed.65  
C. ROYAL PRIVILEGE  
The king and much of the royal family enjoy 
sovereign immunity that precludes suits against 
them without the monarch’s consent. Essentially, 
none who have the status of shree panch (literaly 
“five times illustrious”) can be subject to either a 
civil or criminal hearing. This also means that the 
sovereign cannot be called upon to give evidence or 
appear in court unless of his own choosing, 
primarily because he is seen to act as a “defender of 
the established law” – including the constitution 
promulgated under his late brother’s name.66 
While almost every monarchy enjoys some form of 
privilege, the extent of such immunity has been a 
matter of growing controversy in Nepal. The king’s 
suspension of the democratic process and frequent 
use of broad emergency powers has led to the 
impression that the crown exists virtually without 
legal check. For example, Crown Prince Paras was 
widely reported to have killed a popular Nepalese 
musician, Pravin Gurung, in a hit and run car 
accident, and suffered no consequences, further 
fuelling the image of a monarchy that is above the 
law and accountability.67 In other countries such as 
 
 
65 Dhruba Kumar argues that expanding the army through 
demobilised Maoists would be both economically 
problematic and encourage the RNA to undermine talks. 
Dhruba instead suggests funding a scheme for the training 
and civil employment of 13,000 soldiers and 25,000 Maoist 
cadres to bring the army down to pre-war levels. See 
“Solution to the Crisis: Military Cuts”, Himal Khabar 
Patrika, 18 April 2003. 
66 Lucy Sullivan, “The Perils of Republics”, Policy, Centre 
for Independent Studies, Autumn 1998. 
67 See BBC’s: “Nepal’s Errant Crown Prince”, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1371524.stm.  
Malaysia, clear abuses of sovereign immunity 
helped propel the overhaul of the le gal system. 68  
The king and royal family do enjoy a number of 
protections ranging from the benign to the 
extraordinary. Like many parts of the constitution, 
a failure by the parties, the palace and society as a 
whole to agree on the “rules of the road” for day-to-
day governance have led to an almost complete 
collapse in understanding of those powers 
legitimately held by the crown. Unfortunately, the 
language used to describe the powers of the king in 
the constitution is broad, and at times ambiguous, 
creating a serious potential for abuse, 
misunderstanding and continuing power struggles. 
An iteration of some of the constitutional powers 
held by the king underscore this point: 
q “no question shall be raised in any court 
about any act performed by the king”;69 
q “no law shall be made having the effect of 
reducing the expenditures and privileges” 
already enjoyed by the king under existing 
law;70 
q “no discussion shall be held in either house 
of parliament on the conduct of his majesty, 
her majesty the queen and heir apparent”;71 
q the king shall appoint the Royal Nepalese 
Ambassadors;72  
q property owned by “His majesty shall be 
inviolable”;73 and 
q the now somewhat infamous Article 127, “if 
any difficulty arises in connection with the 
 
 
68 Malay rulers have had a long tradition of abusing their 
criminal and civil immunity. Various examples include the 
clubbing to death of a golf caddy by the reigning agung in 
1987, demands for excessive timber and land concessions 
and a refusal to pay debts and comply with contractual 
obligations. See Prof. Mark R. Gillen, “The Malay Rulers’ 
Loss of Immunity”, Victoria University Occasional Papers, 
no. 6, Canada, 1995. 
69 Part 5, Article 31. 
70 Part 5, Article 29. 
71 Part 8, Article 55, subsection 1. 
72 Part 20, Article 120, subsection 1. 
73 Part 5, Article 30, subsection 2. 
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implementation of this constitution, his 
majesty may issue necessary orders to 
remove such difficulties and such orders 
shall be laid before parliament”. 74 
Most experts believe that the king is currently 
operating beyond the bounds of Article 127, a fact 
that the constitution and the debate on the me rits of 
royal privilege should take into consideration. 
Some other countries provide useful models of 
reform that might be welcome in Nepal as part of 
any constitutional revision to clarify the legal status 
of the monarchy. There has already been talk of 
limiting those who hold shree panch to either the 
king solely or the king, queen and crown prince.  
For example, while both the Spanish and Belgian 
constitutions contain articles defining the inviolability 
of the monarch, the king is not vested with power.75 
In Belgium, Article 102 states that: “Under no 
circumstances may a written or verbal order of the 
King diminish the responsibilities of a minister”, and 
Article 106 also stipulates that “no actions of the King 
may take effect without the counter-signature of a 
minister, who, in doing so, takes responsibility upon 
himself”.76 Similarly, the Spanish Constitution 
specifies that the Monarch “exercises the functions 
expressly attributed to him in the Constitution and the 
laws”, that he/she “is not subject to any  
responsibility” and that sovereign actions “shall lack 
validity without countersignature”.77 The clear logic 
underscoring the assigning of responsibility is to 
ensure that an elected figure who is subject to public 
oversight bears responsibility for the acts of 
government. The adoption of such language in Nepal 
would ensure that open-ended emergency powers are 
not used to supersede the democratic process. 
Given the uncertainty of the current situation and 
the direct benefits they enjoy, a number of palace 
loyalists may be reluctant to see the king surrender 
 
 
74 Part 20, Article 127. 
75 Constitution of Belgium, Article 88 [Responsibility]; 
Constitution of Spain, Article 56, subsection 3 [Head of 
State]. 
76 Constitution of Belgium, Articles 102 [Exclusive 
Responsibility] and 106 [Counter signature]. 
77 Constitution of Spain, Articles 56, sub-sections 1 and 2 
[Head of State], 64 [Counter signature]. 
any control. Yet, if the monarch is indeed serious 
about both peace and reform, he needs to recognise 
that without some genuine gestures of good will, 
his own actions will seem every bit as self-serving 
as the political party activities he has repeatedly 
criticised. As a political scientist remarked, “Any 
system that starts with immunity at the top sets a 
bad precedent”.78  
King Gyanendra should make clear that as part of 
any negotiated peace settlement or constitutional 
revision, the monarch and the royal family will no 
longer be considered above the law, and that the 
parliament or courts could question actions by the 
king. This would send a profound message that the 
king supports accountability across society and is 
serious about supporting the rule of law as the 
fundamental underpinning of Nepalese life. Such 
an action would also go a long way to ensure that 
the institution of the monarchy survives. If the 
palace continues to be dominated by hardliners who  
feel that the monarchy can remain the driving force 
in public life, ever greater public support for a 
republic may emerge over time. Further, if the king 
continues to maintain an increasingly transparent 
fiction that all his actions have been constitutional, 
both the parties and the Maoists may be pushed to 
more extreme positions. 
D. MINORITY RIGHTS , THE ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM AND DECENTRALISATION 
Control of the RNA and royal privilege pale in 
complexity and scope when compared to the 
tangled nest of issues raised by ethnicity, caste, 
religion, language and minority rights. While all 
involve far-reaching considerations, they are bound 
together by a common notion: many Nepalese feel 
that they are denied access to the full fruits of the 
state within the current system, whether education, 
jobs, self-expression or political power. There is 
broad agreement that power and privilege have 
been narrowly distributed across society, but how 
best to redress this is a matter of significant debate.  
 
 
78 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 24 April 2003. 
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The gulf of privilege is all the more acute because 
of Nepal’s low standard of living and limited 
economic opportunity, and the experience since 
1990 has fuelled cultural tensions. It appears that 
religious and cultural identities are being more 
forcefully asserted as time goes by, in part because 
they were long suppressed in the Rana and 
panchayat eras.79 Mahednra Lawoti comments:  
In Nepal, the Bahun-Chetri (combined 
population of 31.6 per cent) and the Newar 
(5.6 per cent population) are the groups that 
are enjoying disproportionate access to 
resources. Jointly, these communities are 37.2 
per cent of the population, but in 1999 they 
were holding more than 80 per cent of the 
leadership positions in the important arenas of 
governance such as the judiciary, executive, 
legislature and public administration. A 
comparison of 1959 and 1999 shows a 
widening of the gap.80  
This has the potential to be highly divisive in a 
country where roughly half the population is under 
the age of twenty and sizable numbers of young 
people have already taken up arms for the Maoist 
cause.81 This very young population may also be 
less wed to traditional institutions, including the 
monarchy, than their predecessors. 
With more than 60 caste and ethnic groups and 
more than 70 languages and dialects, there are 
bound to be tensions within Nepalese society. 
Critics of the current constitution do not need to 
look far to find ammunition for their arguments that 
the text seriously disadvantages certain ethnic, 
caste and linguistic minorities. Constitutional 
clauses drawing the most attention in the current 
debate include: 
 
 
79 See Harka Gurung in “Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu 
Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal”, 
ed. By D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarecka and J. Whelpton, 
Amsterdam: Academic Harwood Publishers. 1997.  
80 Lawoti, Mahendra, “Defining Minorities in Nepal”, 
Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol. II. No. 1., 
March 2002. “Bahun” is synonymous with Brahmin.  
81 See http://www.panasia.org.sg/nepalnet/socio/pop.htm.  
q establishment of Nepal as a “Hindu and 
Constitutional monarchical kingdom”;82 
q establishment of Nepali as the “official” 
language, with all other mother tongues 
“national” languages, and the determination 
that “each community shall have the right to 
operate schools up to the primary level 
[emphasis added] in its own mother 
tongue”.83 
q restrictions that “no person shall be entitled 
to convert another person from one religion 
to another”, and,84 
q prohibition against forming any political 
party on the basis of “religion, community, 
caste, tribe or region”. 85 
Even the words of the national anthem have come 
under scrutiny for their less than democratic tone.86 
Many concerns about the current system and the 
domination of a traditional Bahun, Chetri and 
Newar elite have led to debates about overhauling 
the electoral system.  
1. Proportional Representation? 
Electoral systems are of particular importance in 
divided societies. At best, they can be designed to 
help mitigate conflict within diverse and divided 
societies. At worst, in the words of Giovanni 
Sartori, they can be the most “specific manipulative 
instrument of politics”.87 
 
 
82 Part 1, Article 4. 
83 Part 1, Article 6, subsections 1 and 2; and Part 2, Article 
18, subsection 2.  
84 Part 2, Article 19, subsection 1. 
85 Part 17, Article 112, subsection 3. 
86 The English translation of the national anthem is: “May 
glory crown you, courageous Sovereign, You, the gallant 
Nepalese, Shri Pansh Maharajadhiraja, our glorious ruler, May 
he live for many years to come and may the number of his 
subjects increase. Let every Nepalese sing this with joy”. 
87 Giovanni Sartori, as cited in Ben Reilly and Andrew 
Reynolds (Eds.,), Electoral Systems in Divided Societies, 
National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1999. The 
multiple variations possible broadly fall into three 
main categories: plurality-majority; semi–
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In Nepal, there is increasing discussion about 
adapting some form of proportional representation 
and even setting aside seats for women, ethnic 
minorities and caste groups. Nepal is currently 
structured as a “first past the post system” where a 
representative is chosen on the basis of a plurality 
within a district. In a system of proportional 
representation, parliamentary seats would be 
distributed among the parties on the basis of the 
proportion of the vote received by each party.  
Both systems have advantages and drawbacks. 
Proportional representation is often seen by its 
critics as encouraging a proliferation of parties, 
forcing extensive negotiations over coalitions, 
fostering fringe parties based on ethnic or 
geographic considerations, and slowing the overall 
legislative process as parliamentarians try to forge 
consensus. The complexity of the proportiona l 
system could also pose problems for a country 
where the political understanding remains 
rudimentary in many locales.  
Yet, it is also clear that Nepal’s experience with the 
first past the post system has not been entirely 
happy. Historian John Whelpton argues that given 
the electoral arithmetic over the past twelve years, 
and with single -party governments being elected 
with the support of only just over a third of the 
electorate, parliamentary majorities may find it 
difficult to achieve their policy agenda in a highly 
polarised political environment.88 Along the same 
lines, another political scientist notes, “The big 
advantage of proportional representation is that you 
don’t get a situation where you have a government 
with only one-third support of the public holding an 
absolute majority in parliament”, as was repeatedly 
the case since 1990. 89 
The greatest advantage of proportional 
representation for Nepal, in terms of levelling the 
playing field in public policy, would be that such a 
system would allow minority votes to be taken into 
                                                                              
proportional and proportional representation. For 
detailed discussion, see The International IDEA Handbook 
of Electoral Design, Handbook Series 1/97, 1997. 
88 John Whelpton, “Nepalese Democracy and its 
Discontents”, paper presented in Kathmandu 24 April 
2003. 
89 ICG interview, 24 April 2003. 
consideration and would encourage political 
development outside the Kathmandu valley. Also, 
by forcing a greater sense of consensus building, 
larger and larger numbers of individuals and 
communities could feel that they had a stake in the 
political process. Yet, the potential drawbacks of a 
purely proportional system should not be dismissed 
lightly, and the political parties themselves have 
expressed some reluctance to embrace such a 
system. A senior UML leader observed, “There 
could be some combination of first past the post 
and proportional, but we can’t go for a full blown 
proportional system”.90  
A compromise that could likely find support among 
the different power centres may well be a mixed 
member/proportional electoral system, along the 
lines of those practised (with some variation) in 
New Zealand, Germany, Hungary and Bolivia.91 In 
such a system, citizens have a ballot that allows 
them to vote for both an individual local 
representative and a political party. Contests for 
loca l representatives are determined by the first 
past the post system, party seats proportionally. 
Thus, the parliament is made up of both local 
representatives and members pulled from party 
lists. Such systems are designed to ensure that both 
local and party interests are represented in a 
balance fairly closely resembling the will of the 
voting public and may well be a good point around 
which to build a constitutional consensus in Nepal.  
2. Reservations about Reservations  
In the frequent discussions of overhauling the 
electoral system, the issue of setting aside 
parliamentary seats for women or disadvantaged 
ethnic and caste groups has repeatedly cropped up. 
In other countries, including neighbouring India, 
reservations have been made for women and other 
segments of society traditionally seen as 
disadvantaged. The 74th Amendment of the Indian 
Constitution requires that 33 per cent of the seats in 
local municipal bodies be reserved for women. In 
 
 
90 ICG interview, Patan, 30 April 2003. 
91 See http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/esyst/ 
govtelect.html  for an official description of New 
Zealand’s system. 
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the national parliament more than a fifth of seats 
are set aside for the lowest ranking in the caste 
system. In the Lok Sabha and State Legislative 
Assembly approximately 15 per cent of seats are 
reserved for such scheduled castes and 7 per cent 
for scheduled tribes.92 
At first glance, quotas to ensure more balanced 
representation would seem to be a powerful tool 
for promoting a greater sense of equality, and 
using the force of law to grant broader 
representation might appear an attractive way to 
break the hold of traditional elites. Yet, the 
Indian experience would also seem to point out 
the many dangers of reservations for Nepal, 
despite the striking differences between the two 
countries. It has demonstrated that instead of 
serving as a short-term boost to mainstream 
traditionally disenfranchised groups as originally 
intended, the reservation system can also be 
transformed into a near-permanent institution. 
The reservation has become deeply sensitive in 
India. Periodic adjustments in reservation 
numbers have been highly controversial and even 
sparked violence. 
Trying to use the reservation system to adjust the 
political balance in Nepal would involve 
extraordinarily complex social engineering. Who 
would be best positioned to decide which of the 
scores of ethnic, linguistic, caste and regional 
groups deserve special electoral set-asides? How 
would these set-asides be adjusted over time as 
demographics invariably shift? Equally important, 
would reservations achieve their goal of ensuring 
greater political and economic equity across the 
society over time? In the absence of wholesale 
investments in basic education and health needs for 
traditionally disadvantaged groups, there would be 
little chance for their situation to improve even 
with greater political representation.  
Reaching agreement on reservations as part of a 
constitutional reform package would be particularly 
difficult. Every side would likely try to manipulate 
quotas to its advantage, and it is difficult to imagine 
 
 
92 “India: A Blow for Women (Parliamentary Quotas are 
not the Answer)”, The Economist, 19 December 1998.  
a constitutional process not quickly degenerating 
amid negotiations over such a divisive issue. It 
would also be quite striking were a constitution that 
expressly forbids political parties on the basis of 
religion, community, caste or tribe to turn so 
dramatically in order to set aside parliamentary 
seats on such a basis.  
Reserving seats for women could find broader 
support and would likely prove somewhat less 
contentious. However, such efforts have also been 
highly controversial in locations as diverse as India, 
France and Indonesia. An additional option would 
be to set aside reservations within parties in terms 
of candidates allowed to contest seats. All this 
would seem to suggest that there is no “magic 
bullet” for constitutionally ensuring broader 
political representation and the follow-on goal of 
translating this representation into greater economic 
and educational opportunity across society. As 
suggested below, the surest route may be to 
decentralise power so that Nepal’s diverse 
communities can more closely design and direct 
their own development. 
3. Religion and Language  
Religion and language loom as important 
constitutional issues, and both will be thorny. 
Religion may be the more difficult of the two. It is 
linked closely to the nation’s status as a Hindu 
Kingdom and the very existence of the monarchy. 
It can be a very emotional issue in Nepal, which is 
far less monolithic than its rather skewed census 
data would make it appear. As Sudhindra Sharma 
argues, “When the census of Nepal indicates that a 
majority of people in the country are ‘Hindu’, it has 
to be clear that they are so only within a broad 
understanding of the term, with the type of 
Hinduism practices in large measure being closer to 
folk religion or shamanism/animism than to the 
form of Hinduism that has been dominant in 
present-day north India”. 93  
That Nepal is not a secular state presents a clear 
case of discrimination to those religious groups that 
 
 
93 Sudhindra Sharma, “The Hindu state and the state of 
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consider themselves out of the mainstream.  One 
Nepalese advocate for ethnic rights asserts that, “A 
Hindu Kingdom cannot be deemed as a truly 
multicultural state or multicultural society. 
Associating the state with a particular religion is a 
recipe for conflict and hampers development”.94 
This same advocate argues, “Just because we have 
a democratic state doesn’t mean we can 
participate”.  
Religion is not only a vital issue for those who 
consider themselves non-Hindus, but also for those 
lower caste Hindus who have often been the 
victims of some of the worst inequalities of the 
current system. Dalits continue to suffer 
considerable discrimination, and despite the lofty 
language of much of the constitution, official 
discrimination continues to be largely tolerated. 
This is in large part due to the fact that the 
government has determined that “traditional 
religious practices” should not be viewed as 
discriminatory. While changing the lot of lower 
caste groups will require cultural as much as legal 
changes, it certainly is reasonable to question the 
pace of change in a government that is now directly 
governed by a Hindu monarch. 
But the notion of declaring Nepal a secular state 
often hits a nerve among even reform-minded 
Nepalese, and the palace will very likely resist any 
such effort. Having a Hindu king within a secular 
state does border on oxymoronic, but should not be 
beyond the question. A Nepalese religious scholar 
suggested that the status of a kingdom should be 
preserved because it represents great potential 
benefit for Nepal: “There are 600 million Hindus in 
India, and this is the only Hindu kingdom in the 
world. In the same way Vatican City has special 
meaning for Catholics all over the world, Nepal 
should take advantage of having the only Hindu 
king”.95 This same scholar argued that Nepal would 
be particularly vulnerable to Muslim and Christian 
proselytising if it were to lift the ban on 
conversions or otherwise lessen its status as a 
Hindu kingdom, although the practice of 
conversion is already widespread. In addition, one 
 
 
94 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 25 April 2003. 
95 ICG interview, 2 May 2003. 
Nepalese political scientist argued, “In many ways, 
Nepal is already more secular then India – even 
though India is a secular state”.96 
Bridging the large divide between those who see 
Nepal’s identity as a Hindu kingdom as 
fundamental to its existence and those who argue 
that only a secular state will ensure fairness to all 
citizens will be no easy task. Given the prominence 
of Bahuns, Chetri and Newars within the power 
structure, those who oppose the formation of a 
secular state are certainly largely dominant. The 
easiest way to square the circle may be to preserve 
a Hindu kingdom that is entirely ceremonial while 
guaranteeing greater legal protections to religious 
minorities and outlawing onerous “traditional 
practices” that have kept Dalits and others 
desperately disadvantaged. The king could also 
help change a culture of discrimination by making 
symbolic gestures to demonstrate that Dalits should 
have equal treatment. 
Nepal’s diverse linguistic landscape has also been 
quite contentious, and even more so as a number of 
ethnic groups have become more assertive since 
1990. Minority groups have decried the 
establishment of Nepali as the official language. In 
addition, the notion that each linguistic community 
has the ability to operate schools only up to the 
primary level has been cited as disadvantaging non-
Nepali speakers. Unfortunately, in Nepal, as in 
many other nations, language policies are a 
reflection of broader issues of power and status. As 
a language scholar noted, “To elevate a language to 
the status of national language is almost always 
based on factors beyond language”. 97  
Given the dominant position of Nepali speakers and 
the low overall economic development, a more 
enlightened language policy will be daunting. 
Those calling for broader language policies will 
face powerful constraints. Nepal struggles simply 
to provide even basic education to most of its 
citizens. For schools to offer Nepali, English and a 
varied menu of local ethnic languages at all levels 
of education simply does not appear feasible at this 
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time, and central authorities will strongly resist any 
effort that would make Nepali elective. While this 
obviously discriminates against many less widely 
spoken languages, the notion that Nepalese officials 
would try to further establish a single language is 
an experience replicated in many countries. 
4. The Case for Decentralisation 
For many Nepalese, particularly those in rural 
villages, democracy remains more theoretical than 
practical. Little in the day-to-day lives of most 
villagers changed with the inception of multi-party 
democracy in 1990. While supporting democracy 
as a concept, many are simply consumed by 
surviving on subsistence agriculture. They do not 
understand how  their vote translates into change in 
their daily lives, and they see little meaning in the 
enthusiastic discussions of electoral reforms or 
constitutional amendments in Kathmandu. A career 
Nepalese government official noted, “Most 
Nepalese vote and they don’t know who they vote 
for. They don’t know what they are doing. We have 
to educate them”.98 Nepalese are no different than 
the citizens of any other nation: voting means a lot 
less when you cannott see the impact of your vote. 
One of the fundamental reasons that democracy 
remains abstract in much of Nepal is that 
governance itself is highly centralised despite some 
modest steps toward decentralisation during the 
1990s, including the Local Self-Governance Act of 
1999. Less than 4 per cent of the national budget 
goes directly to local governments. During the civil 
war, government functions often collapsed inward, 
as officials operated with a bunker-like mentality in 
district headquarters. Some argue that it is a 
paradox of modern Nepal that despite the 
weakening of the central state by instability, local 
bodies and market institutions have not become 
correspondingly more empowered. 99 They also note 
that without strong central support, effective 
decentralisation will be impossible. The argument 
continues that decentralisation would not only 
 
 
98 ICG interview, 20 May 2003. 
99 Dev Raj Dahal, Hari Uprety and Phanindra Subba, “Good 
Governance and Decentralisation in Nepal”, The Centre for 
Governance and Development Studies, Kathmandu. 2002. 
entail a major institutional shift, but a cultural one 
as well: 
A deeply rooted patrimonial political culture 
and patronage -based development practice in 
Nepal has often made the protection of public 
interest a highly conteste d terrain. A 
patrimonial culture places the government as 
a giver and the people as a receiver of 
development benefits, not the claimants of 
Constitutional rights and duties. It does not 
treat people as co-producers of development 
but only consumers. 
Yet, Nepal would appear to be an ideal 
environment for decentralisation (or at least a very 
poor place for centralisation) given the remoteness 
of many villages, the general lack of internal 
infrastructure and the incredible diversity of culture 
and language. This would also allow for the greater 
involvement of citizens at the local level and in 
theory provide for development programs more 
suited to local need. Substantial decentralisation 
would also permit some steam to escape from the 
issues of language, ethnicity, class and 
representation. Traditionally disadvantaged groups, 
while still being a minority on the national stage, 
could play a substantial and sometimes even a 
majority role at the local level. 
The importance of giving power to local structures 
– and beginning to show that the institutions of 
government can actually work as part of the peace 
process – cannot be overstated. In many parts of the 
country, already minimal government has stopped 
functioning altogether. There is little political 
activity, police and the RNA sit in their district 
headquarters, village development committees have 
been disbanded and development programs work 
around government more than with it. 
Decentralisation would also allow local 
governments to serve as a breeding ground for 
talented politicians to emerge nationally, and would 
encourage local communities to serve as 
laboratories for forging effective public policy and 
more diversified economic development. While 
most villagers may care little about proportional 
representation, there is every reason to believe that 
they can make forward looking decisions about 
local development needs, educational priorities and 
Nepal: Obstacles to Peace  
ICG Asia Report N°57, 17 June 2003 Page 22 
 
 
 
how to generate income. As one member of an 
NGO working in the western part of the country, 
conflict in Nepal is often “not so much about 
politics as much as where the new well will be 
located”. 100 
However, any decentralisation will have to be 
backed by both a genuine revenue stream and a 
clear understanding that the central government 
will let local governments govern. Ge nuine 
decentralisation should be welcomed by the parties 
(the UML took a lead in this regard when it was in 
power), the Maoists and even the palace. Donors, 
frustrated by central bureaucracy and persistent 
corruption at the national level, have also 
increasingly advocated working more with 
empowered local institutions.  
However decentralisation is time-consuming, costly 
and difficult and needs to be managed with care. 
Any process would have to consider issues of 
establishing standards for government services, 
tackling corruption and establishing systems for 
resolution of disputes between central and local 
governments. Decentralisation would need 
considerable popular and political support, the 
backing of donors and technical assistance from 
outside. Many issues relating to the risks of conflict 
that can come from shifting power away from the 
centre would also have to be considered.  
A number of models could prove effective, 
including even a federal system. But important 
principles should guide this effort. Most advocates 
of decentralisation stress that the current division of 
the country into 75 districts is not effective, and 
that the number should be in the range of ten to 
twenty. 101 While some commentators have 
suggested redrawing the districts along ethnic lines, 
this would seem to be a potential source of 
confusion and divisiveness. New administrative 
lines should be drawn geographically, following 
ridgelines and not rivers (as has often been done in 
the past). This would allow regions that are already 
serving as areas of economic and social integration 
to remain intact and not be artificially divided. 
 
 
100 ICG interview, 28 March 2003. 
101 Nepal is further divided administratively into five 
development regions and fourteen zones. 
Most importantly, new units of local government 
would need to be given the money and authority to 
ensure that “decentralisation” was not merely a 
paper tiger.  
By including fairly sweeping decentralisation as 
part of any constitutional package, the Kathmandu 
elite could also take sting out of some issues where 
it might be less willing to compromise, such as 
secularism and teaching in minority languages 
beyond the primary level. As a journalist argued, 
giving districts control over their own funding 
would give them “power over their identity”.102  
All Nepalese forces today need to move toward 
agreement on the broad strokes of how society 
should govern itself, and decentralisation, a mixed 
member proportional electoral system, a monarch 
not viewed as acting above the law and greater 
civilian control of the RNA may be some of the 
starting points for consensus and power sharing.  
 
 
102 ICG interview, Patan, 29 April 2003. 
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III. MANAGING THE PEACE PROCESS 
How then does one begin to reconcile very 
contentious divisions between palace, Maoists and 
political parties within a peace process that could 
produce a viable and inclusive series of 
constitutional reforms? Obviously, there is no 
simple answer and building confidence and 
designing a sound institutional structure cannot be 
done either painlessly or by fiat. That said, three 
important areas stand out for beginning a process 
that can help move the country forward: effectively 
monitoring the ceasefire code of conduct before 
relations between the royalist government and the 
Maoists further erode; finding a way to facilitate 
negotiations more smoothly; and developing a 
mechanism to include the alienated political parties 
in a multi-party government that allows elected 
leaders a substantial voice in questions of war and 
peace.  
Progress on all of these fronts will require some 
sacrifice from government, parties and Maoists 
alike. It will also likely require a more broad 
minded and forward looking approach from an 
international community that needs to understand a 
sense of flexibility and pragmatism is essential to 
securing a lasting peace. Putting a more effective 
process in place is fundamental to the peace effort. 
Otherwise, it may be impossible to tackle the many 
substantive issues that loom on the horizon.  
A. MONITORING THE CODE OF CONDUCT 
The announcement by the government and Maoists 
that they had reached agreement on a “code of 
conduct” 13 March 2003 to serve as ground rules 
during the ceasefire was a significant breakthrough. 
However, how this code will be implemented and 
monitored continues to be a matter of some 
concern. At the peace talks, royalist negotiators and 
the Maoists agreed to form a monitoring committee 
of thirteen members. It will be chaired by a 
representative from the National Human Rights 
Commission and include delegates from the 
Federation of Nepalese Journalists, the Nepal 
Women's Commission, the national bar association, 
the Federation of Nepalese Chamber and 
Commerce and Industry, the National Dalit 
Commission and the Federation of Nationalities.  
These monitors are to help observe the situation 
across the country, and independently report 
violations, either mediating to reduce tensions at 
the local level or reporting clear violations when 
they cannot be mitigated. Negotiators established a 
three-point approach that the committee should 
employ: establishing monitoring bodies in all 75 
districts, establishing a uniform definition for 
observing the code, and actually monitoring 
compliance with the ceasefire. In the words of a 
former government negotiator, the monitoring 
teams “need to be an independent body at the 
people level”.103 
While the effort to involve a large cross section of 
civic groups is welcome, there are reasons to 
question the efficacy of the design. In far flung 
locations across the country, small groups of 
human rights activists may not be well positioned 
to do the crucial work of determining when 
violations take place and who is to blame. At the 
district and village level, code of conduct monitors 
may well be subject to intimidation from either 
Maoist or government forces, and they may 
become unduly enmeshed in the local political 
situation. Neither the Maoists nor the government 
have been particularly enthusiastic about anyone 
determining if the y are violating the code of 
conduct, but it is equally clear that self-policing 
will do little to generate a greater sense of mutual 
trust. It is also not clear how more serious issues 
will be arbitrated at a national level through the 
monitoring teams.  
Having small groups of experts from the UN assist 
the National Human Rights Commission, as the 
Commission itself has suggested, would be a 
welcome step. The UN could provide much needed 
technical assistance that would strengthen the 
Commission’s capabilitie s at the central level as 
well as in the field. By establishing a relationship 
with the UN, the Commission would be far better 
positioned to receive both the training and 
resources needed to carry out its mandate. In 
 
 
103 ICG interview, Kathmandu 24 April 2003. 
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addition, international experts might help insulate 
monitors from undue pressure from either 
government forces or the Maoists. Bringing modest 
international expertise to the challenge of 
monitoring would also be quite useful in helping 
establish broader confidence in the situation on the 
ground, particularly at a time when there is so 
much suspicion between Maoists, government and 
parties. As a UML party leader argued, “If we are 
for transparency, why hide the process?”104 
Deploying small squads of international experts to 
work with the monitors could provide a “built in 
cooling down period” when tensions arise in a 
fashion that might not be possible with teams solely 
composed of Nepalese civic groups.  
The idea of bringing in international experts has 
thus far been still-borne for several reasons, the 
most of important of which would appear to be 
Indian opposition. A Western diplomat observed 
that India has adamantly opposed international 
monitors for the code of conduct and international 
mediation of the peace talks because “all roads lead 
to Kashmir”. New Delhi worries that any such 
involvement would set a precedent for that disputed 
region. However, there is little objective reason to 
believe that Nepal would establish any type of 
precedent for Kashmir. Norwegian mediation in Sri 
Lanka has not noticably produced more pressure to 
internationalise the Kashmir situation, for example.  
Choosing the right international experts to help the 
existing monitoring structure, and making sure that 
their numbers remain small, could go a long way 
toward mollifying Indian concerns. For example, 
several key nations should not be involved with 
monitoring the code of conduct, including India, 
the U.S., Pakistan and China. Nationals from any of 
these powerful states would raise concerns of 
foreign meddling and set off alarm bells about 
efforts to play a larger regional role.  
Fortunately, successful monitoring of the code of 
conduct does not require extensive military strength 
or advanced intelligence capabilities. Instead, it 
demands the help of the UN in fielding small 
numbers of technical experts to assist Nepalese 
 
 
104 ICG interview, 30 April 2003. 
groups on the ground and so create a greater aura of 
fairness and serve as a buffer between disputants. 
The infusion of technical expertise could go a long 
way to reassure the donor community that both the  
government and the Maoists were taking the peace 
process seriously and so would likely speed 
provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict-
affected areas while building the capacity of 
Nepalese human rights groups. While the 
government has complained about the relatively 
modest pace of humanitarian assistance deliveries 
in western Nepal, its own deliberate pace on the 
peace talks is partially to blame. 
With the infusion of international technical 
assistance, one of the first tasks for the National 
Human Rights Commission and the other 
designated monitoring groups – working in 
conjunction with the negotiating teams – would be 
to spell out a sound method for adjudicating 
disputes over the code of conduct. Security and 
preventing intimidation of the monitors remain 
foremost concerns, and these will be difficult to 
address as long as a more significant international 
presence remains deeply contentious in both 
Kathmandu and New Delhi. 
B. FACILITATING TALKS ?  
Suggestions that the peace process might be 
accelerated by bringing in outside facilitators or 
mediators remain controversial. Nationalism and 
pride seem to be common threads that bind palace, 
parties and Maoists, and many have claimed almost 
defiantly that “Nepal can make peace by itself”, 
and “We are all Nepalese; we know how to talk to 
each other”. That Nepal is a relatively small nation 
between China and India has fuelled a certain 
defensiveness in dealing with the outside world and 
an environment where suspicion of foreign 
intentions is widespread and sometimes well-
grounded. These attitudes have helped shape a 
decidedly cool reaction to the notion of outside 
mediation or facilitation of the peace process in 
some quarters. 
Yet, there is a very complex, interlocking set of 
issues on the negotiating table and a clear need to 
expand the negotiating process beyond simply 
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palace representatives and the Maoists. A frustrated 
Western diplomat complained of both: “They don’t 
have a clue about the negotiating process”.105 
Another Western diplomat aired similar concerns : 
“They need facilitation. I don’t think the people are 
really up to the task. It takes a special set of 
skills”.106 As a Scandinavian diplomat argued, 
mediators would also be helpful so that “walking 
out of the room won’t derail the process”.107 The 
heated disputes that have already occurred over the 
issue of returning the RNA to barracks indicate that 
a truly neutral figure or figures in the room could 
well improve the general sense of communication, 
prioritise the negotiating agenda and ensure that the 
overall process proceeds in a more orderly fashion.  
One individual involved in the talks stated plainly 
that he was “personally very concerned” that a lack 
of experience and professionalism among the 
negotiators was a dangerous sign and that “because 
of this la ck of seriousness, the war could again 
escalate”.108 A former member of the government 
negotiating team, departing from the delegation’s 
public position, privately conceded, “The peace 
process is a very complex process and there is room 
for mediation in these circumstances”.109  
Obviously, like the notion of deploying small teams 
of international monitors to help assist in 
overseeing the code of conduct, only the right kind 
of mediation or facilitation makes sense. Any 
international help in this regard should be as low-
key as possible, could take place entirely behind the 
scenes and focus primarily on establishing a sound 
procedure and agenda for moving negotiations 
forward. It need not come in an official government 
form. No one wants the U.S., the UK or India to 
broker a peace in Nepal. However, there are a 
number of international organizations and NGOs 
specifically trained in mediation, facilitation and 
conflict resolution that could help the talks advance 
in a more professional manner.  
 
 
105 ICG interview, 24 April 2003. 
106 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2003. 
107 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 3 May 2003. 
108 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 23 March 2003. 
109 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 19 April 2003. 
Part of the reason the government appears to have 
resisted mediation (aside from India’s concerns), is 
a belief in some Nepalese quarters that any 
mediator or negotiator would actually serve as a de 
facto negotiator – which should clearly not be the 
case. Yet, the difficulties encountered during the 
2001 talks – when even some of those involved in 
the process admitted that they had little training or 
background for properly conducting talks – should 
be instructive. Recent comments by the current 
facilitators, who also served in 2001, have made 
clear that there is room for improvement. Padma 
Ratna Tuladhar said that the role of the facilitators 
had not been spelled out clearly, and objected to 
their exclusion from some negotiating sessions.110 
Damannath Dhungana also complained that the role 
of the facilitators has never been made clear and 
that they were not allowed to attend some 
negotiating sessions, leading him to wonder, “If we 
are not allowed to be present at the talks venue, 
how can we resolve the problems”? 111  
While the Maoists continue to welcome mediation, 
the government has resisted. The international 
community should quietly and firmly express its 
support for the notion to the government of Nepal, 
and help in this or other ways to facilitate the talks. 
C. A ROLE FOR THE PARTIES?  
The royalist government approach of negotiating 
with the Maoists first and then forming a multi-
party government appears to be the reverse of what 
is required. The appointment of Prime Minister 
Thapa was seen by the parties as a further betrayal, 
and c learly chilled the environment with the 
Maoists. Any impression that the king could 
rapidly get the country back on track and neatly 
restore democracy has effectively been dissipated. 
The king would be far better served by bringing the 
political parties back into government so that the 
 
 
110 The Kathmandu Post, 5 May 2003. 
111 The Himalayan Times, 5 May 2003. However, 
Dhungana seemed to blur the line between facilitator and 
advocate, by adding, “I am in favour of a constitutional 
assembly and if I cannot forward my views, I will feel my 
presence meaningless”. 
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parties and the palace could present the Maoists 
with a unified and expanded negotiating team. 
Hoping that the parties will support a peace deal 
from which they have been entirely excluded 
simply does not seem realistic. Nor is it realistic to 
think that the king will soon simply reinstate 
parliament. A Nepalese government official said, 
“The political parties should be accommodated and 
given a role in the process”, while making clear that 
calls for the restoration of parliame nt were a non-
starter: “This is where the country is now; you can’t 
wish something that isn’t there”.112 
Neither the street protests by the parties nor the 
palace’s continuing efforts to keep the parties off 
balance are productive. A journalist observed that 
the government has taken an approach of 
“rubbishing the parties as they go” during the 
negotiation process, and that this is both somewhat 
unseemly and ineffective in that it makes the king’s 
rhetoric in support of democracy seem increasingly 
hollow.113 A senior UML party leader complained 
that the king’s go-slow approach was part of a 
broader effort to “create a political vacuum 
everywhere”.114 For all their flaws, the political 
parties have a legitimate place in public life and 
should be at the negotiating table. 
To reach such a point will demand constructive 
steps by both the parties and the king. As a means 
to build pressure to restore democracy, the parties 
should once again forward a joint selection for the 
post of prime minister, and go even further by 
agreeing to a specific power-sharing proposal for 
an all-party government, including a detailed plan 
identifying both party officials and skilled 
technocrats who are prepared to serve. The parties 
should agree to assign the Home Ministry – a key 
position that has often been used to secure political 
advantage – to a neutral, technocrat. Such a step 
would send a welcome signal that the parties are 
serious about governing and able to overcome their 
internal divisions. It would also help shame the 
international community into more robustly 
supporting the restoration of democracy.  
 
 
112 ICG interview, 20 May 2003. 
113 ICG interview, Patan, 3 May 2003. 
114 ICG interview, Patan, 30 April 2003. 
Upon formation of an all-party government, the 
government negotiating delegation could be 
reconfigured to include party representation. This 
would force the parties to accept greater 
accountability for issues of war and peace, and 
force them to tackle subjects with greater substance 
than simply objecting to royal “regression”. 
Establishing an all-party government would have 
several other advantages. The notion of simply 
suspending democracy until peace is achieved 
essentially gives both king and Maoists an 
indefinite veto over democracy they can use if they 
see it in their tactical interests. This runs directly 
counter to the long-term interests of both the people 
and the international community. Creating an all-
party government would also allow a more orderly 
process of moving toward eventual elections, either 
for local bodies or parliamentary seats, security 
permitting. 
There has also been discussion of including the 
Maoists in an all-party government, but this 
appears premature, particularly as they have made 
clear that they would expect to lead such a 
government. A Western diplomat said he would be 
“shocked” if the prime minister slot was to go to a 
senior Maoist. 115 International concerns are just one 
of the many obstacles to resolving the situation 
with the Maoists, and having an all-party 
government in place to help move through the 
thicket of procedural and constitutional issues 
seems to be an invaluable part of moving Nepal 
back toward normalcy.  
 
 
115 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 29 April 2003. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
With pressures mounting on the peace talks from 
all directions and the parties and the Maoists more 
willing to express their opposition to the palace in 
the streets, it would be easy for Nepal to slip back 
toward violence. The deep fissures within society 
will only widen if the three sides remain focused 
solely on a search for a greater share of power. 
While the political parties, the palace and the 
Maoists have all made clear that peace cannot be 
achieved without them; they have yet to 
demonstrate that peace can be made with them. All 
deserve a reasonable share of blame for the failure 
to include broad segments of society beyond their 
respective power bases in the search for peace and 
in a broad effort to forge a new or revised 
constitution. 
Yet in many ways, Nepal is better positioned than 
ever before to reach a basic consensus on its 
institutional architecture. There is widespread 
agreement that much of the current system does not 
work and that the state need to be reoriented 
fundamentally to provide more equitable 
opportunity for broad swathes of the population. In 
addition, the experience since 1990 has helped 
create a much wider, more active network of social 
groups representing virtually all elements of society 
that could play a vital role in shaping a reformed 
constitution and viable peace process.  
A number of steps are vital to get the situation back 
on track. First and foremost, the royalist 
government, and the king himself, need to take a 
more credible and serious approach to both the 
peace talks and governance as a whole. The current 
arrangement of having a government that is hand-
picked by the palace yet operates under the fiction 
that the king is not active in its day-to-day 
management is simply not feasible over time. Nor 
is presenting a choice between peace and 
democracy acceptable. The king needs to work 
directly and constructively with the political parties 
to establish a multi-party government, and the 
parties themselves must demonstrate that they are 
willing to act responsibly within such a power 
sharing arrangement. India, the United States and 
United Kingdom should make clear that the further 
provision of military assistance to the government 
of Nepal is contingent upon far more substantial 
efforts at the negotiating table and a clear strategy 
and timetable for restoration of democratic order. 
In terms of the peace process itself, a more 
professional approach to negotiations appears vital. 
The frequent confusion, slow timetable, changes in 
personnel and lack of practical confidence building 
measures are all growing threats to the talks. 
International technical assistance could be directed 
toward helping establish a more orderly secretariat 
for the talks, providing mediation training and 
offering behind-the-scenes legal advice. The latter 
would be useful in the drafting of potential 
constitutional revisions and encouraging 
accountability for human rights abuses during the 
conflict. A clearer process of agenda setting, 
genuinely empowered negotiators, the inclusion of 
representatives from a multi-party government and 
international technical assistance to help those 
Nepalese groups monitoring the code of conduct 
governing the ceasefire would also be 
extraordinarily useful.  
There remain serious and legitimate questions 
about the sincerity and ultimate intentions of the 
Maoists, and a clear reluctance in some 
international quarters especially to believe they are 
bent on anything short of total state domination. 
However, it would be tragic if the peace process 
unravelled because of incompetence, unanticipated 
delays or a failure to place broadly representative 
and empowered negotiators at the peace table. 
Establishing a credible peace process and putting 
Nepal back on the road to democracy are ultimately 
the only effective means to end the conflict and are 
necessary no matter what the ultimate intentions of 
the Maoists. 
With the fundamental issues of governance and the 
state now on the table, the challenge is for the 
major forces within society to coalesce around a 
constitutional model that will work for Nepal’s 
culture, society, geography and history. This would 
be an immense challenge even for the most stable 
societies. Yet, within Nepal’s remarkable diversity 
and frequent hardships there are also tremendous 
strengths. No peace process or constitutional 
reform will bring speedy change to the difficult 
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lives of many Nepalese but they can provide much 
needed signs that change is possible and that 
central authorities are willing to think of the 
national interest in the broadest sens e.  
Kathmandu/ Brussels, 17 June 2003  
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CIAA  Commission for the Investigation for the Abuse of Authority  
RNA  Royal Nepalese Army 
RPP  Rastriya Prajantra Party 
UML  Unified Marxist Leninists Party 
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